World Alliance News Letter

Vol. XXXIII, No. 10 Published by The Church Peace Union October 1957

HOLBROOK LIBRARY PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

Politics and Religious Belief

WHAT the believer hopes for in society is easy to state in general terms. He hopes for justice and truth (who, indeed, does not?), for the manifestation of God's righteous purpose among men. But when this hope becomes specific, when religion and politics actually meet, when the question of *means* arises, then the possibility of distortion is at hand. History is rich with examples of such distortion: of secularized religion and of clericalized politics. To avoid it, the careful balances, the subtle distinctions between politics and belief must be reexamined and reasserted in every age.

One group which is reexamining and reasserting them for our age is the group of Protestant thinkers gathered around *Christianity and Crisis,* the biweekly "Christian Journal of Opinion" published in New York. A selection of essays from this journal has recently been published in a paperback edition under the title *What the Christian Hopes for in Society*. The volume is reviewed elsewhere in these pages, but the questions it asks are so relevant to the concerns of the *News Letter* that editorial comment on them seems appropriate too.

FROM the standpoint of the believer, what specific dangers does the political-religious encounter hold? There seem to be several that persist throughout Western history. One of them—and the least subtle, certainly—is that in the encounter religion will lose its transcendent character and become a mere appendage to the age. Another is that religion, appalled by the imperfections of the secular, will think its vocation is to issue moral pronouncements upon them; still another is that religion, in full retreat from the secular, will lapse into a utopianism that can end only in despair.

Paul Tillich has warned religion against that conformity to the age that he calls "opportunism": "A word can be spoken by religion to the people of our time only if it is a transcending and therefore a judging and transforming word. Otherwise, religion would become another contributor to what is accepted anyhow, another servant of public opinion."

Some aspects of America's "religious revival" make Tillich's warning especially pertinent today. The world is always happy to use religion for its own ends, and religion, too often in Western societies, has permitted itself to be used.

"The terrible general tendency of the conservative world," Jacques Maritain once observed, "is to link the defense of its material interests with the defense of religion." Such a tendency is evident in the curious identification of "Americanism" and religion now made in some quarters. From the reading of certain speeches and sermons, one might gather that the Almighty had taken a desk in the U.S. State Department.

But to confuse Divine Providence with the national aspirations (no matter how righteous) of any people is blasphemy. God is not "our" co-pilot and His name must not be used as a kind of convenience—a support for the nation's complacency or a flatterer of its ego.

THE danger for religion of opportunism, of an easy conformity to the secular, comes from the powers of the world. (Satan is forever taking religion to the mountaintops.) The more subtle dangers for religion—of an abstract moralism, of an irrelevant utopianism—come from religion itself. They represent a *reductio ad absurdum* of its own best genius. They are, essentially, *religious* temptations.

Religion is at home with the ultimates. It knows the Why of things. Politics—the world—moves on the level of proximates. The question here is How. And that is the reason the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light.

The man at home in the sphere of religion, in the sphere of the ultimates, in the knowledge of Why, may grow impatient with the poor proximates, the expedient How, of politics. Moralism and utopianism are his escape from politics. They are also his betrayal of the world, his refusal to deal with it in terms of the possible. He will lecture it or he will propose "ideal" solutions for it. He will not encounter it.

But religion's insight is that man is, at once, *in* history and *beyond* history. Any view which, abstractly or practically, cancels out half of this insight

cancels out half of man. It distorts the nature of reality itself.

And this is the trouble with both secularism and utopian religion. The former, imprisoning man in the temporal, denies the possibility of transcendence from history. The latter, despising the temporal, denies the very reality of history.

But the role of religion, in the meeting between politics and belief, is to affirm, and work with, man's dual vocation. "Religion can overcome opportunism," Paul Tillich reminds us, "because it can overcome utopianism."

A MAGAZINE like *Christianity and Crisis* insists on this dual reality of man's destiny, on the fact that he is both in and beyond history. It works with the imperfect stuff of politics from the vantage point of transcendent religion. It tries to effect a genuine meeting between the two without sacrificing the claims of either. And this is the only way in which the encounter of politics and belief can be of value.

In his review of *What the Christian Hopes for in Society,* James O'Gara quotes from Kenneth W. Thompson's essay "Prophets and Politics": "Religion is at one and the same time irrelevant as a sure guide to the perplexities of practice and eternally relevant as ultimate transcendent principle." Religion, in other words, provides a vantage point and a criterion for judging the issues of this world. It does not provide a rule book for solving this problem or that. It does not relieve us from the painful, complex burden of politics, which is the burden of making prudential decisions as problems arise, never sure that our decision is the proper one. Religion provides principles; politics provides the means of realizing them. (And politics sets the limitations of the possible on the realization of principles too.)

Religion, as religion, cannot tell us whether or not the Anglo-French action in the Suez was justified, or resolve the complicated questions of justice between the Arabs and Israel. It cannot, as religion, determine the national policy on disarmament or the details of economic assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the world. But it provides the imperatives of justice and charity, of a universal morality, for all of these things. It should be the soul of which concrete political actions are the form. It is the conscience of society, as well as society's judge. It is engaged with the temporal, without becoming assimilated by it.

This means, of course, that any journal which works in the area of politics and religious belief works in an area of constant tensions. Such a journal will have few—probably no—ready answers. Certainly it will have no easy answers if it is to respect the claims of both the world and of religion. It will seek out those questions of national policy on which the two may agree, and point out the ones over which they must be at enmity. And in all this it will hope to contribute something of value to the common morality, the common intelligence, the common good.

RECOMMENDED MAGAZINE ARTICLES

The Silence in Russian Culture by Isaiah Berlin. (*Foreign Affairs,* October 1957.)

In this analysis of the Socialist experiment in Russia, Dr. Berlin reveals how the "artificial dialectic" of post-revolution Stalinism has resulted in "a long blank page in the history of Russian culture."

Liberty and Equality by Reinhold Niebuhr. (*The Yale Review,* Autumn 1957.)

Dr. Niebuhr traces the growth of libertarian and equalitarian concepts in relation to liberal and conservative thought in the West.

Crisis of Freedom by August Heckscher. (*The Commonweal,* September 20, 1957.)

The failures and illusions of Liberalism as an interpretation of freedom are seen by the author as having produced a political crisis: "The question we face is whether the individual of conscience and conviction is any longer to have a place in our society."

Spotlight on Algeria by Sal Tas, Raymond Aron and André Philip. (*The New Leader,* September 16, 1957.)

In this report, comprised of three articles, alternative proposals for a just settlement in Algeria are critically examined.

Poland's Year of Change by Lucjan Blit. (*Commentary,* October 1957.)

The prospects for Polish Communism depend, in the writer's view, on the extent to which Gomulka's policies remain independent of Moscow on the one hand, and the "revisionist" movement in the Party on the other.

This Scepter'd Isle by Kenneth Tynan, John Osborne. (*Encounter,* October 1957.)

Two spokesmen for Britain's generation of "angry young men" contribute two essays, one satirical, the other splenetic, impaling the Monarchy, the Welfare State, the Class Society, Toryism (both political and cultural) Evelyn Waugh, Graham Greene, and the BBC upon the hooks of decay.

The Ethics of Foreign Aid

Economic Assistance is a Matter Both of Self-Interest and Moral Concern.

Vernon Holloway

[T is imperative that in the churches and elsewhere we prepare ourselves to speak in more prophetic and discerning terms about the meaning of responbility and the requirements of justice for a wealthy nd powerful nation in relation to its international eighbors, especially the underdeveloped countries. is imperative that we do this because the neighbors' eed is urgent, the timing of such action is important, nd our nation has a substantial portion of the reurces which are required.

Too many of our political leaders and representaves have been speaking glibly about reducing the deral budget by eliminating foreign aid programs, the assumption that the latter are unessential to e national interest, and with the argument that the udget asked by the President, the structure of federal xation, and the size of the national debt are too eavy a burden for the public and the national econny to carry.

The lack of decisive leadership in Washington in efining the national interest, the partisanship of Coness as its members seek credit for "economy" and ax reduction" in the coming election year—all of ese are factors which combine with public apathy to ceive us with respect to the nature of our opportuni-s and obligations.

THE population of the United States is a minority group in an enviable economic position if we comre ourselves with the poverty, disease and hunger despread in Asia, Africa and portions of Latin nerica. Economically we are a highly self-sufficient untry with a tremendous productive capacity. We ve depended upon the rest of the world mainly for ace, and to a limited extent for raw materials, goods d markets. We constitute about six percent of the orld population, but consume forty percent of the ods and services annually consumed in the world. e have the capital and the technology, and a way of e which is geared to replacing and improving the eans of production.

Dr. Holloway is the author of *Religious Ethics and the Politics of ver.*

In the United States and Western Europe, in Canada and the English-speaking Commonwealth nations, very few persons live amidst the poverty that characterizes most of Asia and Africa and much of Latin America. The peoples of these economically underdeveloped nations have received some benefits and have also suffered from the economic progress of the industrialized nations. They have gained by the sale of agricultural and mineral products which were important raw materials for the industrialized countries, but in return many of them have become financially dependent upon one or a few exports which are subject to wide fluctuations of price in the world market. Their participation in international trade as a means for securing capital, essential to industrial development, rests upon a slender and unstable base.

The impact of modern medical knowledge has dramatically reduced the death rates in the economically backward areas, but this has led to rapid increases of population and to new strains upon the available food supply.

Agricultural and industrial development, public education and voluntary family planning, are therefore becoming a life-and-death matter, especially in densely populated countries such as India, Indonesia and Egypt. Per capita income in Indonesia is worsening. In India it is important for today that agricultural output be brought to the level of efficiency which American farmers achieved a century ago.

Substantial assistance, both technical and financial, is needed from the Western nations. The sharing of technical knowledge, the provision of loans and grants for specific projects of agricultural or industrial importance, or for roads and harbors and schools which are essential for general development—these are among the priorities. And these types of assistance could be made available from North America and Western Europe if there were an adequate public conscience. A good beginning has been made in the last few years in regard to technical assistance, but financial assistance in the form of loans and grants is still a major problem.

One of the popular objections to U.S. appropria-

tions for foreign economic assistance is that people in underdeveloped regions have always been poor, that they do not know anything better, and so why should it concern us?

This objection may be correct about these peoples' heritage of poverty, but it is ill-informed about their present expectations and their increasing frustration. The indifference revealed in the question: "Why should it concern us?" is the clue to a deeper problem than "ignorance"—the problem of moral apathy, of inability to discern "the signs of the times" and to meet our responsibilities.

Peoples who in the past have been passive in the face of poverty are now determined to increase their standards of living. This is especially true of those who have achieved emancipation from colonialism. They need and they want technology as a means of ending poverty. More than half of the world population total has been involved in the last thirty years in transition from political dependence to independence. Malaysia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, Ceylon, Burma, India, Pakistan, Arab groups of the Middle East, Israel, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Ghana—all of these and more are involved.

Our American governmental leaders and our Congress have been preoccupied with defense against overt aggression by the Soviet Union and Communist China, and with the attempt to bolster local regimes and ruling elites in unstable areas where the danger exists of Communist penetration from within. But this does not meet the real concern of Asian and African peoples. And it is here that the Soviet Union has a great advantage. It has risen swiftly from feudalism to industrial power. It did so at great cost in human freedom and human lives. But to Asiatic peoples who have known little of freedom and who are desperate for economic progress, the Soviet example is tempting. *Our* indifference and *our* inaction will leave totalitarianism as the only apparent way out of poverty and hopelessness.

It is possible that the political future of Asia may hinge upon the success or failure of India in achieving economic progress by democratic means. It is certain that unless the Western nations show a greater concern for the well-being of the underdeveloped areas (and it must be a concern that transcends the strategic interest of the West in political allies) the day will soon come when we shall have missed our greatest opportunity to assist them as free nations and also to serve our own deepest interest.

WE cannot rightly ask any nation, including our own, to sacrifice its interests to those of other nations or to international society as a whole, and especially so when this involves the interest of the nation in its existence and security. But we can condemn and guard against national egotism and complacency. W can rightly insist that the national interest must be d fined and interpreted so as to recognize and not contradict the legitimate needs of others and the m tual interests of the society of nations.

The real interests of the United States are not serve by indifference to the plight of mankind. If our natio must maintain a heavy burden of armaments and military assistance to allies because of Soviet pow and imperialism, we must beware of the peril of mi using our own power and we must seek earnestly an patiently for political settlements and the internation control of armaments. What is equally important, an in the present situation very urgent, is that we unde stand the limitations of military power, for this alon cannot compete with Russian and Chinese Com munism for the attention and interest of Asian an African leaders and peoples.

Our present foreign policy is rightly concerned wit containment of Soviet expansion, and with the mai tenance of political conditions in Europe and As which will remain unfavorable to internal Communi growth. But let us note that the four years of Marsha Plan economic aid contributed substantially to th success of this policy in Western Europe. Our ec nomic assistance was employed to serve the reconstru tion of Western Europe and also to strengthen Amer can security. But in the Middle East and in Souther and Southeast Asia our approach has been primaril in terms of military aid programs, and Congress ha been reluctant to support foreign assistance excep where this was tied to a military formula.

A disastrous mistake is therefore in the making we continue to identify security only with the militar strength of our nation and its allies. In South an Southeast Asia alone there exists one fourth of th population of the world. Our national security interes does not require that these people be aligned with u but this interest is genuinely served if such peoples ar enabled to avoid alignment with Soviet or Chines Communism.

In the interest of American security it is importan to note (and politically relevant to do so) that *most* o the "uncommitted" or "neutralist" countries are i the underdeveloped areas.

IF a more effective program of social education an action is to be forthcoming, enabling the nationa interest to be defined in greater moral depth, an emphasis upon the importance and relevance of ec nomic assistance programs will have to be carefull prepared. Such an emphasis must not only be capabl of capturing the imagination of people, but it mus intelligently foresee a host of practical and technica problems.

Among the practical problems is the grave questio

of political leadership. Will the President and the Secretary of State speak forth in more stern and forthright terms about our responsibilities and opportunities as a nation? Is there leadership in Congress and in our political parties that is capable of seeing above and beyond the popular theme of tax reductions? Will our agencies of government and of private research, in cooperation with Congressional leaders, achieve a practical proposal—an "outline" of what should and can be done?

There appears to be a substantial margin of agreement among many specialists in foreign affairs, and to this effect: "The objectives and methods of foreign assistance can be clarified, and competent administration assured. The benefits of these programs to American interest greatly outweigh their cost. That cost is part of the inescapable price of an American foreign policy calculated to promote our deepest interest as a nation." (From the Report of the Eleventh American Assembly on International Stability and Progress, New York City, May 1957.)

The problems of technical judgment in any substantial plan for an economic assistance program are many. The following are only a few illustrations:

(1) To what extent should the program be a cooperative one with the other Western nations, perhaps the capital exporting countries? And what should be the financial share of the United States?

(2) To what extent should such a program be administered through United Nations agencies as well as through regional or bilateral arrangements?

(3) What is the "absorptive capacity" of the underdeveloped areas? Which ones must be given preference for political reasons? Which should be omitted because of present political instability, or lack of managerial skills?

About five percent of what the United States has expended on foreign aid programs since the Korean War has been spent to assist economic development. The great bulk of foreign aid expenditures has been for direct military or "defense support" policies, which were tied in with attempts to form military alliances in Western Europe, the middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East. It is unlikely that these military aid programs can be reduced in the near future. A positive program for economic development assistance will therefore require an increase in the federal budget.

One of our serious domestic political issues is the size of the federal budget and the amount of the national debt. "Trimming the budget" and "reducing the debt" are frequently cited as great moral imperatives. Here is another area where competent technical judgments are needed in the service of political ethics.

Since the cry over the budget and the debt serves to inhibit both Congress and the public when it comes to appropriations for foreign economic assistance (as well as for other important programs), we need to know how much of this cry is only "ideology," how much of it is slavery to a myth. If it is true that national productivity is the real standard of national wealth, this should be made clear. If the national debt is primarily a credit transfer within the country, with the federal government acting like a bank—transferring credit from citizens (through taxes) to other citizens (who hold savings bonds)—why should we worry about this any more than we do about the total amount of bank debts?

What we need particularly to note are the reports of higher national income, of increasing economic productivity. We should remember that during World War II we carried a terrific burden of armaments while maintaining our standard of living. And we should note that our production of goods and services has increased more rapidly than our taxes. It is difficult to see why we cannot afford an annual minimum of one to two billion dollars more for foreign aid programs.

The International Development Advisory Board reported to President Eisenhower in March 1957: "The U.S. could make a significant increase in the capital formation of the underdeveloped countries with no reduction at all in U.S. income and with only a small reduction in the amount by which our income increases each year."

IN the twelve years since the end of World War II we have had to deal with many emergencies, and we have done reasonably well in meeting them. Our support of UNRRA helped to save Europe from starvation. Then came the French and British loans and the Marshall Plan. Next there was NATO and the Korean War. It would be understandable if we grew weary, since we are unaccustomed to the responsibilities that attend our recently acquired position of power. But we should neither flatter ourselves nor feel sorry for ourselves. In the Second World War and also in Korea the ravages of war occurred on soil other than our own, and greater losses were suffered by others than ourselves. And now, in a period of relative prosperity, we are tempted to be complacent and we are reluctant to think deeply about the basic issues of our time. We are threatened with failure of moral nerve.

The argument for a more adequate program of foreign economic assistance can be made exclusively on the grounds of national security. This is a real and legitimate consideration. But are we so lacking in moral character that we should feel ashamed to want to help others above and beyond our self-interest in security? There are prudent economic and security factors which the Administration and Congress must weigh. But a deeper vision is also necessary if leadership is to be forthcoming, and if the imagination of the public is to be stirred.

Books in Review

An Expression of Christian Concern

What the Christian Hopes for in Society: Selections from "Christianity and Crisis" edited by Wayne H. Cowan. Foreword by Reinhold Niebuhr. Association Press. 125 pp. 50 cents.

By James O'Gara

THOSE who know *Christianity and Crisis* have come to expect certain things in its pages—Protestant convictions; a tone of moderation; the avoidance of the utopian; the use of reason; above all, perhaps, the absence of any ideological black-and-white, good-guys-and-bad-guys approach to complex problems.

Such persons will not be disappointed in *What the Christian Hopes for in Society*. For here, in a slim yet significant volume, are eight essays taken from that publication, written by John C. Bennett, Margaret Mead, Francis Pickens Miller, Reinhold Niebuhr, David E. Roberts, Kenneth W. Thompson, Paul Tillich, and Amos N. Wilder.

And yet, perhaps I should not say that those who know *Christianity and Crisis* will not be disappointed in this volume. They may be the ones who *will* be disappointed, but only because the limited selection we have here has failed to illustrate some facet of the publication's character that they particularly admire.

As a Catholic, for example, I know there is something I miss in the volume, and that is more indication of the kind of editorial position taken by *Christianity and Crisis* on issues involving the relationship between Protestants and Catholics. Too often these matters arouse the worst kind of bickering. Very frequently they lead to emotional outbursts on both sides that are downright harmful.

Normally, however, *Christianity and Crisis* approaches such vexing questions in a spirit of moderation, without the near-hysteria that has come to characterize so many Protestant-Catholic differences in this country. One may agree or disagree with its editors on a particular point, but the publication's comments always set one to thinking, because they obviously represent the serious and conscientious efforts of thoughtful and religious men, rather than the outcries of the unthinking.

If religious tensions in this country are not to get worse rather than better, we need more of this spirit. In reading this collection, therefore, I could only regret that the comments by the editors of *Christianity and Crisis* on such issues were not represented.

In other respects, though, the spirit that is evident in *Christianity and Crisis* is clear in this volume. Witness, for example, these words of John C. Bennett: "There are no Christian guarantees of any particular good to be realized in the secular order, but there are Christian grounds for hope that man's cause in this world is no lost cause and that there will be significant embodiments of God's righteous purpose in human society." Or those of Francis Pickens Miller: "The perfectionist in his way discredits Christian ethics as much as the man who compromises his Christian ethics." Or of David E. Roberts, who wrote: "In a sense, it is always too dangerous for men to grasp the real import of the New Testament—any time, anywhere, in any society. This is because the gospel always lays bare elements of tyranny which society regards as necessary for its own security."

Christianity and Crisis, it should be clear, is no ordinary run-of-the-mill publication. On almost any subject, its comments are stimulating, thoughtful, meaningful.

The words of Kenneth W. Thompson in "Prophets and Politics" are typical of the magazine's approach to the religious-political dilemma: "Religion is at one and the same time irrelevant as a sure guide to the perplexities of practice and eternally relevant as ultimate transcendent principle."

Or perhaps most characteristic of all are the words of Reinhold Niebuhr in "Religiosity and the Christian Faith": "Our religiosity seems to have as little to do with the Christian faith as the religiosity of the Athenians. The 'unknown god' in America seems to be faith itself . . . It is as difficult in our day as in the day of Jeremiah to preach 'the word of the Lord,' for that runs counter to the complacency of men and of nations. It is sharper than a 'two-edged sword.' It must hurt before it can heal."

And if the contributors to *Christianity and Crisis* are occasionally in disagreement with each other (as on questions of foreign aid Margaret Mead and Kenneth W. Thompson seem to be, with the latter getting my vote), this too is typical and good.

THE essays in *Christianity and Crisis* and in this volume are, of course, written from a Protestant point of view. Since I write as a Catholic, it should be clear that the theological differences between me and the authors are often large. In a volume like this containing the work of such men as Reinhold Niebuhr and (perhaps particularly in this case) Paul Tillich, how could it be otherwise? To say that there are between us no real differences in belief, or that these differences do not really matter, would be to belittle their convictions, and mine.

(Even in this volume there are some things said that could cut deeply, unless they are meant ironically—witness, for example, one essay's reference to the Pope and to Stalin in the same breath, as it were, as though the author might in fact equate them.)

Still, with all that said, it should be stressed how much is said here with which all men concerned with religious values could agree, for the emphasis in this work is not on theology but on society, and on the task of making incarnate in our society the ideals of truth and justice and love we all revere.

The editors of *Christianity and Crisis* are intent on exploring the meaning of religion for the world around us, so that it may reflect, however feebly and sporadically, some of the Divine love and goodness.

—Mr. O'Gara is Managing Editor of The Commonweal.

They know that our times need men with religious convictions who will give their attention to politics, to the world of art and science and learning, to national and international affairs. They realize that we have here no lasting home, and that there are many failures for every one success. Yet if the task is never done to our satisfaction, who can look around him and say that we should not turn our energies to work nonetheless?

Indeed, the problems that now confront us would seem overwhelming, if we could not call upon God for help. Little Rock, Hungary, poverty in the midst of riches, slave labor camps and totalitarianism, secularism, skepticism and unbelief, and hanging over all alike—Protestant, Catholic and Jew, believer and unbeliever, black or white—the shadow of the Bomb and mass destruction.

In the face of all this, says *Christianity and Crisis,* the man of religious convictions cannot stand idle and afar off, unless he has no fear of the Lord God who will judge us all. He must concern himself, and it is such expressions of Christian concern that this volume contains, concern not with any dream world that is the figment of a utopian imagination, but with the real world—its poetry and its politics, its aspirations and its limitations, its hopes and its fears, its promise as well as its failures.

And this—its expression of Christian concern—is why this volume is important, and why *Christianity and Crisis* is important, more important than any bestseller or mass-circulation magazine.

Outlook for the United Nations

Issues Before the Twelfth General Assembly edited by Anne Winslow. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 185 pp. 25 cents.

By George A. Beebe

FOR eleven years it has been the pleasant custom of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in its *International Conciliation* series to put before us a number entitled *Issues Before the General Assembly*. On hand now is the September 1957 release covering the Twelfth General Assembly.

Since the last General Assembly, there is reason to believe that public interest in the UN as a forum is deepening. The Suez and Hungarian crises filled elements in our society with a poignant new sense of the United Nations as a political tool and social necessity. The move to establish a "United Nations Peace Force" captured the imagination of many and lifted this previous troublesome concept into the realm of political reality. This new interest, however, has produced some new difficulties.

In some quarters this new awareness of the UN encourages haste and bad judgment. It is possible to misread the potential effectiveness of the organization and to emphasize too strongly the opportunities that seem to be missed. There is a continual, sub-surface debate between a gradualistic element that would welcome specific programs to strengthen the UN and the more impetuous element that brands the UN as ineffective because it does not try to make itself into a kind of world government.

A second difficulty, too widely evident on the part of some governments, is over-commitment to the UN as a sort of universal panacea, or perhaps, in some cynical quarters, as a rug under which to sweep problems that seem too difficult for a particular government to cope with. It should be obvious, however, that the United Nations at this point in history cannot become a dumping ground for the foreign policy of any country.

In view of such difficulties, it is clear that the UN needs a more informed public support. Volumes such as the present one can help to bring the public's view of the United Nations back into perspective.

IN the first pages of this handbook, the Twelfth General Assembly is properly set in its historical framework and buttressed with useful detailed references. The documentation is excellent, offering a tidy catalog, logically organized, of topics to be discussed.

But there remains the impression that the compilers of this manual have in mind no specific audience—unless it be made up of professors of international relations who need a shelf document to turn to occasionally for a paragraph in their lecture notes.

For the interested non-academic citizen there is not much in this volume to recommend. No one can argue the value of historical background and plenty of it is here, but there is altogether too much of it at the expense of a *projection of issues.* It is difficult to spot an issue without an intensive reading.

In short, the booklet is not the handy layman's guide that someone ought to prepare. Perhaps a broader connection could be made by providing a section which partially explained the rudiments of the General Assembly's processes, even though this section had to be repeated every year. It is false to assume technical knowledge on the part of people who are nevertheless issue-conscious. It may very well be that two publications are needed, for the present volume demands an informational supplement.

Another disappointment with this and previous issues is the "factual" nature of the publication. Set up as a fact pile to interpret the impact of past events upon the coming Assemblies, it tends to neglect the flavor of the atmosphere in which the UN works. By narrowing the focus to the practical budgetary and parliamentary concerns, for instance, no sense is communicated to the casual reader of the rich human interplay in which decisions are taken and introduced. Because the United Nations is a human institution, a human account of it is essential, especially when trying to determine the directions it may take.

Apart from these reservations, it remains an act of public service that such a compendium is available annually so that those who are concerned may have in condensation the immediate past record of the General Assembly as well as a guide to its future.

—Mr. Beebe is Director of the Institute for International Order.

COMMUNITY IN THE WORLD

"For All the World's Children"

Since Halloween falls close to United Nations Week (October 20-26), a worthy community project for children is the "Trick or Treat" for UNICEF. Last year, children across the country collected three-quarters of a million dollars in pennies, nickels and dimes for the benefit of the United Nations Children's Fund. A UNICEF Halloween planning kit, containing sufficient material for a group of twenty-five, is available at a cost of $1.00 from the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, United Nations, New York.

A World Affairs Program

The Minneapolis *Star* has launched its 12th Annual Program of Information on World Affairs, designed as an aid to junior and senior high school students in their study of vital international issues. The Program is easily adapted for use by adult study groups, community and world affairs clubs and other organizations. Sponsored by the Minneapolis *Star* under the guidance of a distinguished group of Minnesota educators, the Program is offered to schools and adult groups free of charge. For study groups outside the Upper Midwest area, there is a yearly charge of $2.00 to cover mailing costs of program materials.

The *Star's* recently published 48-page *World Affairs Guide* outlines twenty-six weekly topics to be covered during the course and provides reference lists and information on how schools and study groups can use the Program to their best advantage. In addition to the *Guide,* the Program contains the following basic units:

A series of twenty-six background articles elaborating and providing latest developments about each of the topics outlined in the *Guide.* These articles are published in the Minneapolis *Star* every Monday during the school year. Advance copies are mailed to educators and group leaders outside the Upper Midwest area.

Twenty-six sets of weekly tests related to the selected topics, the background articles, the reference materials, and to current world events. These are available in the *Star* or through the mail to program participants.

The World Affairs Teacher, a periodical designed to aid the educator or group leader in methods of instruction and pertinent course problems.

Last year more than 1,200 teachers and 1,000 Upper Midwest schools co-ordinated the Program with classroom studies. Some 975 clubs and groups in the Upper Midwest also requested copies of the *Guide.* The World Affairs Program has received the commendation of such figures as Dag Hammarskjold, Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles.

Requests for materials or further information should be addressed to Mrs. Ruth Gall Shipley, World Affairs Program, Minneapolis *Star,* Minneapolis 15, Minnesota.

At the United Nations

By a vote of 77-1, Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand was named Assembly president, as the Twelfth General Assembly convened in Manhattan last month. Dag Hammarskjold of Sweden won re-election as Secretary General by an 80-0 vote.

The Steering Committee accepted a U.S. proposal to put aside Red China's membership bid. The General Assembly voted to keep the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary officially before the session. The September 23 vote on the item was 57-10 with six abstentions. Yugoslavia voted with the nine-nation Soviet bloc on the ground that a discussion could serve no constructive purpose.

World Alliance News Letter

Vol. XXXIII, No. 10 October 1957

The World Alliance News Letter *is published monthly by The Church Peace Union. Subscriptions are $1.00 per year.*

The Church Peace Union: Ralph W. Sockman, President; *George B. Ford,* Vice President; *Arthur J. Brown,* Treasurer; *A. William Loos,* Executive Director; *John R. Inman,* Associate Executive Director; *William Clancy,* Education Director; *William J. Cook,* Field Director.

Articles in the News Letter *express the views of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the official position of The Church Peace Union.*

Office Address: 170 E. 64th Street, New York 21, N. Y.

Editorial Board

WILLIAM CLANCY, Editor

A. WILLIAM LOOS JOHN R. INMAN WILLIAM J. COOK

World Alliance News Letter
The Church Peace Union
170 East 64th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Form 3547 requested.